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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an exploratory look into the relationship between the strength of state- 
based identities and globalization. I argue that the differences in the state-based identity of 
Estonia and Moldova help explain their relative openness towards globalization. State-based 
identity strength is indicated by three factors: First, common culture – a solid collective 
memory that ties past, current, and future identity to the state. Second, language – indigenous 
language reinforces state-based identity, whereas vestiges of empire and a language foisted 
on the people by outsiders indicates a weaker state-based identity. Thirdly, state policies – 
education, citizenship requirements, and public holidays are used to illustrate how the state 
communicates identity to the population and molds loyalty of the collective. I find Estonia 
has a stronger state-based identity and engages with globalizing influences, whilst the weaker 
state-based identity of Moldova epitomizes the defensive perception of  global influences 
leading to undermining state-based loyalties, therefore Moldova concentrates on internal 
issues, and is less engaging with globalization.
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
As globalization becomes more prevalent, a proliferation of collective identities 
emerge. These new identities are often compared directly or implicitly against the benchmark 
of state-based identity – the most salient and generalizable identity of the recent past 
(Kennedy and Danks 2001).  Although used as a benchmark, there is a lack of investigation 
into variations in the strength of state-based identities. The history and contextual struggle of 
formation of state-based identities differs, as does their level of influence on collective 
identity today, thereby making the strength of state-based identities relevant to discussions of 
identity changes and challenges (Miller 1995, O‘Byrne 2001). Of particular interest to 
scholars of both identity and globalization are the post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe.  
Those states were all stripped of the collective identity they had shared under Soviet rule and 
were ―reborn‖ to the global stage at the implosion of the Soviet Union. Since then, the 
strength of their state-based identities and their engagement with globalization has varied. 
The relationship between state-based identities and globalization is under-theorized. 
As explained below, I suggest in this thesis that variations in the strength of state-based 
identity changes the perceived threat level of globalization, explaining states‘ engagement 
with, or attempts to inhibit globalizing influences. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and its political identity as leader of international communism, political mobilization in these 
states has changed. Are these relatively recently autonomous states welcoming of globalizing 
norms or threatened by a perceived erosion of state-based loyalties as the economic, social, 
and cultural influences of globalization potentially disconnect people within their borders 
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from their state-based identity? Do the contradictory yet concurrent forces of globalization 
and localization subvert or reinforce state-based identity? In pursuing the answers to these 
questions, my research offers support to my contention that the strength of state-based 
identity reveals important factors for understanding states‘ embrace of or discontent with 
globalization, and explores the consequences of political loyalties extending beyond the 
limits of the state in Eastern Europe. 
In this thesis I will utilize a nuanced definition of globalization, focusing on 
interactions relevant to the socio-cultural dimensions of globalization.
1
  Through two case 
studies focusing on Estonia and Moldova, I will assess the under-studied connection between 
the strength of state-based identity and the process and acceptance of globalization, and 
investigate the accompanying changes of collective identities at the state level. This leads to 
developing identity constructs that are transformative and uncertain, neither primordial nor 
unidirectional. Globalization has increased the level of agency available in the formation of 
collective identities, which are no longer dominated by sovereign state borders.
2
  Which 
aspects of globalization are internalized to become norms, to become part of the identifying 
―we-ness,‖ and which are rejected as being part of the global ―other‖ are among the most 
interesting questions in International Relations (IR) today. 
 
                                                 
1
 As defined in the A.T. Kearney and KOF indices of globalization.  The other dimensions are Economic and 
Political. 
2
 Of course, there have always been alternatives to state-based identities; families, clans, and tribes have 
also held preeminence in earlier times, historically, these were commonly bounded by geography as well. 
The reduced capacity of state control over the internal face of sovereignty is what seems to be changing 
under non-territorial globalizing influences today. For a detailed view of the conflicting realities of the 
dominant strength of sovereign state-borders, see Krasner, Stephen D. 1999. Sovereignty: Organized 
Hypocrisy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
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My research is focused on the relationship between globalization and state-based 
identity. I will delve into the historical development of state-based identity in Estonia and 
Moldova, the watershed ending of the Soviet control over their collective identity, and the 
response to globalization vis-à-vis its relationship to the strength of their state-based identity. 
The research presented below reveals a counter-intuitive result: I find that states with strong 
state-based identities are readily engaged with globalizing forces, embracing novel values 
and norms of the exogenous cultural influences, whilst implementing strong actions to 
preserve the values, traditions, and beliefs of the pre-existing cultural identity; because of 
there being a strong collective sense of identity they are open to the new experiences offered 
by the ―other‖. Conversely, I find states with weaker state-based identities to be more limited 
in their enactment of policies of cultural protectionism, and having a more limited 
engagement with globalizing influences, attempting to avoid floundering in the unknown by 
minimizing exposure to exogenous cultural influence. The cases chosen will offer insight 
into the Eastern European region, and the results of this research may prove useful when 
extrapolated to other areas of the world. 
In Chapter One I have introduced my thesis and posited that the strength of state- 
based identity is linked to state reactions to globalization. The rest of this thesis will unfold in 
the following way: In Chapter Two I guide the reader through the globalization and identity 
literature, including looking at the theoretical side of globalization vis-à-vis the Held and 
McGrew typology of globalization: dividing globalization scholars into one of three 
categories, Hyperglobalists, Skeptics, or Transformationalists. This thesis builds from the 
transformationalist school as I move into the literature on collective identity. I review 
literature that fits into my four divisions of collective identity based on their relationship 
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between agency and territory. Chapter Three presents the state-based identity theory and 
discusses identity inculcation through socialization as a form of cultural protection. 
In Chapter Four I present the methodology of the thesis, explaining my choice to use 
the KOF globalization index to measure globalization, discuss the case study selection and 
the structure of the upcoming case studies. The next chapters, Five and Six, apply my theory 
to the real world through two case studies – Estonia and Moldova – by looking at the history, 
language, education and collective-identity within each state and how that affects their 
reaction to globalization (measured by the KOF index).  Comparing the theory to the cases, I 
will assess the viability of the connection proffered as a link, highlight similarities and 
differences in the cases and their implications, and recommend future paths of study. In the 
conclusion I return to the major points and offer my final thoughts. 
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CHAPTER 2.  OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
What is Globalization? 
 
As is the case of so many social science concepts, there remains a lack of agreement 
in scholarly discourse about how to define globalization. That globalization cannot be 
measured by a common unit makes comparisons difficult; proxy measurements must be used 
as heuristics and are therefore open to subjective interpretations. There are many 
conceptualizations of globalization used by scholars looking at a variety of questions that add 
to the complexity of debate and even foster discord. On one extreme, Anthony McGrew 
presents Schicksalsgemeinschaft – a shared destiny of humanity united in one global 
community – is a ―feel-good‖ way to view globalization.3 At the other extreme, according to 
Susan Strange, since the globalization label may be universally applied as much to the 
Internet as to a hamburger, critics maintain that the very lack of a standard definition of 
globalization means that there is no point in studying it (Strange 1996). 
Many definitions equate globalization with economic interdependence. These assess 
globalization solely by using economic measures. More encompassing conceptualizations, 
identifying globalization as a series of social as well as economic flows, incorporating the 
spread of people, goods, information and ideas – at a greater velocity, intensity, extensity, 
impact, and social-level saturation than the planet has ever experienced before – provide 
space for investigations not limited to economic boundaries (Blum 2007, Held and McGrew 
1999, 2008). 
 
                                                 
3
 McGrew, A. (2008) p.16 
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However, defining globalization in terms of flows is not enough because it 
concentrates on an approach that moves from the ―global‖ to the ―local‖ and omits the give 
and take of local influences within the process.  For this thesis, I conceptualize globalization 
as a dynamic process of interactions, constrained by neither physical borders nor 
psychological boundaries at the global, regional, and local levels of society. Paradoxically, 
actors must deal with these interactions even though, to a large extent, they cannot control 
them; globalization must be responded to directly at each level of society as part of the 
transformative process (Keohane and Nye 2000, Rosenau 2003, Ferguson and Mansbach 
2004, Blum 2007, Nederveen Pieterse 2009).  Not being limited to economic integration or to 
flows occurring at the system level, my definition notes a fundamental yet understudied 
aspect of globalization – that it cannot be assessed solely at the structural level and that the 
relationships formed are not always positive and linear as there may be contradictory 
interactions taking place. 
Localization is one of the contradictory interactions, seemingly a freestanding 
concept, but actually fundamental to the understanding of the implementation of globalizing 
influences. Localization is assiduously pushing local norms, habits, beliefs, and traditions to 
the forefront of societal interactions, even at the expense of something potentially more 
―efficient‖ but which is regarded as having come from outside the cultural or historical 
psychological and physical space of the polity. This may be seen as a backlash to 
globalization (Rosenau 2003, Blum 2007). However, localization is not merely outright 
rejection: it is part of the on-going process of negotiating and renegotiating a newly 
constructed, and constantly changing intersubjective consensus of what is the appropriate 
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course to take to ensure the local culture and identity thrive in a multidimensional global 
political space. 
Rather than following the presumptive ―normal‖ flow of globalization affecting 
people locally, we can also look at theorizing how the local contributes to the global: after 
all, every influence that is classed as ―globalizing‖ has nascent roots in territorial locations 
that are somebody‘s ―local‖. Take for example, the ―international popularity of Irish music, 
dance, film and pubs‖ leading some to claim a ―Celtic culture revival.‖4   Rather than being 
steamrolled by globalization, Celtic national identity seems to be gathering global steam as 
the world-wide popularity of such spectacles as ―Riverdance‖ suggests (Fagan 2001). By 
taking a multidimensional stance we can also highlight the multigenerational effects that 
globalization may have on people. 
Conceptualizing globalization, Held and McGrew provide a typology that forms the 
standard for differentiation of scholarly views in globalization discourse – the three types are: 
Hyperglobalists, Skeptics, and Transformationalists (Held and McGrew 1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Fagan (2001) 
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Table one: Conceptualizing globalization: three tendencies 
 Hyperglobalization Skeptics Transformationalists 
What‘s new A global age Trading blocs, 
weaker 
geogovernance than 
in earlier periods 
Historically 
unprecedented levels 
of global 
interconnectedness 
Dominant features Global capitalism, 
global governance, 
global civil society 
World less 
interdependent than 
in the 1890s 
―Thick‖ (intensive 
and extensive) 
globalization 
Power of national 
governments 
Declining or eroding Reinforced or 
enhanced 
Reconstituted, 
restructured 
Driving forces of 
globalization 
Capitalism and 
technology 
States and markets Combined forces of 
modernity 
Pattern of 
stratification 
Erosion of old 
hierarchies 
Increased 
marginalization of 
South 
New architecture of 
world order 
Dominant motif McDonald‘s, 
Madonna, etc. 
National interest Transformation of 
political community 
Conceptualization of 
globalization 
As a reordering of 
the framework of 
human action 
As 
internationalization 
and regionalization 
As the reordering of 
interregional relations 
and action at a 
distance 
Historical trajectory Global civilization Regional blocs/clash 
of civilizations 
Indeterminate; global 
integration and 
fragmentation 
Summary argument The end of the 
nation-state 
Internationalization 
depends on state 
acquiescence and 
support 
Globalization 
transforming state 
power and world 
politics 
    
Source: Mansbach, Richard W. and Kirsten L. Rafferty. 2008. Introduction to Global 
Politics. p. 747. NY: Routledge. 
 
Skeptics 
 
Skeptics focus on the economic dimension of globalization. Skeptics minimize the 
notion of global culture or global governance in future, instead being of the view that states 
will maintain status as the primary actors in global interactions (Krasner 1995), with a strong 
tendency towards regionalism with world trade dividing into three main trading blocs: 
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Europe, Asia-Pacific, and North America (Held and McGrew 1999). Skeptics such as Niall 
Ferguson claim that globalization is not a new concept; indeed, he argues that from 1870 
until World War I the interconnectedness of the world‘s economies looked much like it does 
today (Ferguson 2005). 
 
Hyperglobalists 
Hyperglobalists, like skeptics, also focus on the economic dimension of globalization. 
Significantly different from skeptics, however, globalization is viewed as a new phenomenon 
to the hyperglobalizer, and the outcome is certain: with the retreat of the state (Strange 1996), 
a single world market is emerging. A borderless economy will replace the state-limited and 
regulated trade of today as national governments are undermined and begin to be unable to 
provide an authoritative allocation of values and resources to their citizens (Held and 
McGrew 1999). 
 
Transformationalists 
Transformationalists do not identify a single cause/mechanism for globalization; that 
is, they look not just at the economic connections but are also drawn to the political and 
social dimensions of globalization. The outcome for society is unknown – change could be 
good or bad for societies or good for some and bad for others. States are evolving, redefining 
powers and legitimacy, but these changes are not viewed in the strictly negative decline the 
hyperglobalists envision. Concerned with cultural changes and the intersubjective nature of 
community, transformationalists such as James Rosenau investigate normative and identity 
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changes as ideas, communication, and agency are constructed much differently today than 
during past epochs (Rosenau 1997, 2003).  I build my thesis on this theoretical foundation. 
The theoretical framework of the transformationalists is based in constructivism, in 
that identity is socially constructed and has no meaning outside of response to the question 
all people both ask and answer: ―Who are you – do we share attributes or not?‖ The factors 
that are taken into account to answer this question change due to outside forces, are non- 
discrete, complicated, and not always rational; but these characteristics are not 
epiphenomenal and can be subjectively assessed. This makes identity hard to study, yet of 
paramount importance to attempt to understand. 
 
What is Identity? 
 
Identities are how we describe ourselves to the world.  They are the key factors by 
which we communicate to others how we are similar to or different from them.  Identity at 
the individual level is only relative to this paper insofar as a collective identity is 
representative of many persons who perceive that they share the same bonds and obligations 
to other members of the polity with which they individually identify (Scholte 2005, Anderson 
2006).  The traditional notion that the state attracts the most loyalty of citizens as the 
foremost way of identifying oneself may be subordinated under globalizing influences.  As 
people no longer have a strict association between their own welfare and that of their 
territorial community, social space (and therefore political space) becomes deterritorialized 
(Rosenau 2003: 176). 
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The pluralistic identities that emerge must be investigated to find how political 
entrepreneurs can manipulate them to coordinate and mobilize their followers. Who we 
consider ourselves to be (and to whom we feel ourselves bonded) directly affects our political 
reasoning and loyalties.  In fact, state-based identity remains of great importance to the 
global system, relevant to all international interactions, and central to discussions of cultural 
and collective identity (Kennedy 2001). 
During the communist era of the Soviet Union, the collective identity of citizens was 
shackled to the state. Post-Soviet polities released a wave of options, actively competing for 
loyalty in Eastern European states. The bewildering selection of identities may indeed have 
had individuals facing their own version of ―Pinocchio‘s problem,‖ as freedom from the 
tethering strings of communism placed the decision of identity, along with the corresponding 
loyalties, firmly into individuals‘ own hands (Strange 1996:198-199).  Set free from the 
Soviet era, collective identity options then included influences of globalization. 
 
Collective Identity Under Globalization 
 
 
 
To assess the collective identity under globalization, I divide collective identities into four 
categories. The four categories each address two major concepts relating to the formation of 
identity: Agency and territory. 
 
 
1. Relationship between globalization and the nationality principle 
2. Proliferation of different kinds of national projects: micro-nations, region-nations, 
transworld nations 
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3. Globalization and non-territorial identity: youth, sexual orientation, race, gender, 
religion, and so forth 
4. Hybridization of identities 
 
1. Relationship between globalization and the nationality principle 
The collective identities debated in this section are geographically based, and the two 
positions that will be put forth have very different answers to the question of whether 
globalization heralds the end of nationalism.  Nationalism has a basis in territory (even if 
different nations argue over the same territory), but the role of the territory in identity 
formation is debatable. 
The role of the state has always been important to discussions of nationalism, and the 
link between the state and the role of the nationality principle under globalization is much 
debated.  Approaching the discussion from the perspective that the nationality principle is 
still important, some authors suggest that the state remains central to arguments claiming 
nationality is still a vibrant factor in international relations, these authors find that the role of 
the state may be changing, but is important to collective identity.  Saskia Sassen epitomizes 
this perspective which finds a large continuing role for the state.  Sassen finds that far from 
being removed from the equation the state is one of the critical ―institutional domains‖ where 
developing globalization takes place. This view puts functionality and decision-making about 
globalization directly into the hands of the state, following a central command style of 
worldwide networks (Sassen 2008: 85). 
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For his part, David Miller argues that nations are anchored in states, that it is 
important for people to have a link with the past, their ancestry as they seek to find their 
place in the world as members of a collective (Miller 1995).  State-based identity is an 
engaged process, maintained through collective will (Miller 1995).  Feelings of state-based 
identity assume a ―pivotal axis‖ for collectivities to claim cultural and collective identity 
(Kennedy 2001).  Small nations, like Scotland, may even be reinvigorated by globalization as 
they can ―assert a cultural identity‖ centering their argument on having been a past 
independent state, whilst prospering as part of a globalized economy (Books 2001: 216). 
These authors have all concluded that nationalism, connected directly to the state, is not 
disappearing. 
In contrast to those like Sassen and Miller, other authors, such as Jean-Marie 
Guéhenno, Robin Brown, and Anthony Giddens, argue that the national project is over; they 
view a state-based national identity as a ―European exception‖ that merely represents a 
shared history and a claim of space (Guéhenno 1995: 4).  A litany of state failures, from 
provision of public goods equally available to inhabitants to the liberation of the economy 
from geographic demarcations, these authors argue, leads to state-based identity becoming 
less relevant as states‘ capacities weaken.  Arguing that we are in the age of information, 
access to networks trumps connections to the nation-state (Guéhenno 1995).  Consequently 
the loyalty of collectives will shift to other polities that can provide more of David Easton‘s 
authoritative allocation of values, as conflicting loyalties will have to juggle ―the coexistence 
of a territorially based political system with an economic system that is increasingly global in 
scope‖ (Brown 1995:58). 
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State-based identity is being brushed aside as political decision-making moves into 
the realm of global interdependence and reflections on identity move to non-territorially 
based dimensions such as students‘ and women‘s movements (Giddens 1991).  Members of 
polities identify themselves through ―life politics‖ rather than as citizens of particular states. 
Primordial identities which are ―intuitive rather than rational, and [are] predicated upon a 
sense of consanguinity‖ will take precedence over loyalty to a state which is merely a 
sociopolitical concept (Conner 2004:24). 
 
2. Proliferation of different kinds of national projects: micro-nations, region-nations, 
transworld nations 
There are some theorists, like Samuel P. Huntington, who believe that collective 
identities, while geographically anchored, do not necessarily require a state focus. These 
theorists range from those who see identity in larger civilizational contexts to those who view 
identity as anchored in smaller micro-nations or self-determination groups.  Samuel P. 
Huntington epitomizes the first view of overarching identity.  He argues that the interactions 
of the world are not effectively conceptualized by breaking relations down into states, rather, 
he divides the world into eight culturally determined civilizations with state-based cores. 
Identity is developed by factors of ―blood and belief, faith and family‖ (Huntington 
1996:126). The borders of civilizations are where conflict is most likely to occur and, 
because of the locations of the case studies in this thesis – bordering states potentially 
clashing at the edge of Orthodox and Western civilizations – Huntington‘s argument must be 
taken into account. Huntington projected that Moldova, as part of the Orthodox civilization, 
would be an unlikely partner to Western civilization, that is, unlikely to join the European 
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Union (EU), while also noting that the Baltic states would fit Western civilization better than 
they did the Soviet-imposed Orthodox civilization (Huntington 1996: 162). 
Modernization does not imply agreement with Western values and Huntington‘s 
civilizations spread across larger regions than a single state – with the exception of Japan – 
though core states matter in each civilization (Huntington 96).  Religion is a major factor in 
what constitutes a civilization for Huntington.  He sees the clashes coming where two sides 
with different ideas of what is right and just meet, with the potential for violence at those 
points where civilizations encounter each other. 
However, far from universal practices and overarching civilization-level identities, 
there have been, since the end of World War II, an explosion of smaller nation-projects, 
micro-nations, and self-determination groups, all territorially based but on a smaller scale 
than traditional states. The collective identities and demands of these groups are important to 
any discourse in international relations, as these actors have regularly affected the 
international as well as their local systems. The Republic of South Sudan represents the most 
recent separatist group to have successfully challenged the status quo of the international 
system and has won recognition as an independent sovereign state.
5
   With over 70 self- 
determination groups reaching the level of armed conflict since WWII, stateless nations will 
continue to fight for greater autonomy even when independence cannot be achieved 
(Cunningham, n.d.). 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Gettleman, Jeffrey. 2011. ―After Years of Struggle, South Sudan Becomes a New Nation.‖ July 9. New York 
Times. 
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3. Globalization and non-territorial identity 
Nicholas Negroponte claims that identity is no longer tied to a physical address, ―that 
place without space‖ is a more apt description for living in the digital world.  Concepts like 
‗addresses‘ have new meanings, for example, co-workers may be reachable only through 
email addresses rather than having specific office designations in a physical building 
(Negroponte 1995: 165).  Forging identity bonds regardless of where members of an 
epistemic community are physically located means that territorial obligations are not 
necessary.  For instance, people today reflect on their own biological narrative and make 
choices that are unlike the geographical and class-based ties of the past.  Allowing for 
profound changes to the organization of time and space, polities are now recombining social 
relations into new collective identities (Giddens 1991, Haas 1992). 
Efforts to form new collective identities under globalization allow a community to 
ignore territorial constraints of physical space and find common psychological space
6
 online, 
whether accessing from Auckland New Zealand, Braşov Romania, or even from practically 
undetermined locations somewhere in Canada. Though contact through traditional letter- 
writing has inspired epistemic communities for hundreds of years, the new communities 
formed online are not limited to élites, globalization permeates through to the masses and to 
places, such as the remote village of Entasopia in Africa, that have never played a part in past 
global communities.
7
 
In effect, these ―electronic tribes‖ may generate a groundswell of political 
mobilization without ever having to set foot in a geographic place, instead congregating en 
                                                 
6
 See Ferguson and Mansbach (2004) for a discussion of psychological distance as ―the degree of 
dissimilarity between cognitive frameworks or ways of looking at, assigning meaning to, and coping with 
the world‖ p. 69. 
7
 Nicholson, Chris. 2009. ―Bringing the Internet to Remote African Villages.‖ February 2. New York Times. 
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masse for virtual protests and electric (in both senses) public discourse.  Examples of these 
political mobilizations are found with regard to gender debates, race relations, sexual 
orientation rights, secessionist movements and youth perspectives.  Even the highly effective 
international efforts of Amnesty International require no paper trail for the community of 
rights activists. Using social media pressure on Azerbaijani President Aliyev‘s Twitter 
account – over 800 tweets in one day – led to the release of Eynulla Fatullayev, a newspaper 
editor named a prisoner of conscience in Azerbaijan, in May 2011 (Amnesty International). 
 
4. Hybridization of identities 
Collective identities are combinations of multiple state-based, regional, partial- 
cosmopolitan, and cyber identities that exist and conflict within the same self.  One way to 
assess these multiple identities is to view them as ―nested polities,‖ a condition in which 
relevant identities wax and wane depending on the salience of specific issues confronting an 
individual
8
 (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004).  The conundrum is that the identities salient to 
an individual are not always unified into one incontrovertible whole – conflicting identities 
may emerge atavistically or fall into dormancy, depending on the issue area being faced at 
any one time. This view of multiple identities is excellent when issues are changing and 
clear-cut.  However, nesting assumes salient identities remain separately defined as differing 
issues come to the fore, and does not account for merging the identities into something new. 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Ferguson and Mansbach define ―polities‖ as ―collectivities with a measure of identity, hierarchy, and 
capacity to mobilize followers for political purposes,‖ p. 24, and ―nesting,‖ as ―the ingestion of one polity by 
another without the disappearance of either.‖ Ferguson, Y. and R.W. Mansbach (2004: 170) 
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A second way to focus on identity formation is to investigate hybridization of 
national identity; the co-mingling of traditional norms with global norms, creating a blend of 
local and national culture and traditions with key features of globalization mixed in. There is 
no nesting in these cases; the hybrid identity cannot be broken back down into parts that are 
able to stand separately.  Instead, it is a genuinely new identity. 
Those critics who dislike the nebulousness of ―globalization‖ may cringe at the 
amorphous notion of ―hybridity,‖ but it is in the nuances of the changes at the collective level 
that globalization is most fascinating. This new form of identity is established in local 
contexts, by breaking hybridization into three elements: ―selective absorption, selective 
rejection, and the assertion of something quintessentially ‗national‘‖ (Blum 2007, 15). 
The hybridization of culture, whilst enriching culture with flavors, ideas, and beliefs 
from outside, and choosing which to adopt into hybridized new identities that develop a 
modern collective state-based identity, is more than ―an immense global urban intercultural 
festival‖ (Jameson 1998: 66).   It is less clear whether the capacity to construct a hybrid 
identity reaches the point where globalization really leads to the superficial ―identity surfing‖ 
described by Lothar Brock, where options abound and identities are not hybridized as much 
as becoming disposable, loyalties a thing of the past (Scholte 2005). 
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Globalization and State-Based Identity 
 
State-based identities are created by people at different moments in history.  Élites 
construct symbols ―to cement their identity and often testify to some ancestral indigenous 
claim.‖ (Gourgouris 1994). The identities created are ―mutable, multiple, overlapping and 
often inconsistent‖ (King 2000:1). 
Crucial to the state-based identities are art, popular culture and media to relate the 
―imagined community‖ into something more tangible, as a cultural touchstone illustrating 
traditions, turning-points of nation forging,
9
 glories – of war or literary accomplishments, 
joining the populace into a common ―we-ness‖ and rejecting all outsiders as ―others‖ 
(Kennedy 2001).  The new alphabets, literary languages, and national symbols that buttress 
cultural changes are important to culture-building, passing to the next generation the 
elements of the society that enjoy parental loyalty. 
Children internalize and naturalize globalized norms that were perhaps new and 
strange to their parents, which have the double-edged potential to reinforce state-based 
connections on the one side (―we‖ versus the rest of the world), yet on the other, to produce 
collective identity constructs that do not include a strict concept of state-based citizenship as 
a primary identity. The agency involved with the formation of identity constructs are not only 
limited by structure, but new forms of structure may also provide some with new 
opportunities for identity formation. 
 
                                                 
9
 For example, Australia and New Zealand forged their state-based identities during the WWI Gallipoli 
campaign. 
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This process is occurring all over the globe. By focusing on the variation in the 
strength of state-based identity in one region, post-Soviet European states, relevant  specifics 
and contradictions may be brought  to light that could be overlooked in a desire to "package" 
the spread  and acceptance or rejection  of globalization across the world. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORY AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The theory that follows is based on a number of critical assumptions regarding 
identity and globalization. To begin with, national identity – state-based identity – is a valid 
and accepted answer to the question ―who are you?‖ An answer such as: ―I am Irish‖ or ―I 
am American‖ is a legitimate way to communicate who you are and how you feel you fit into 
the world (Miller 1995:10-11).  Identity – whilst being a social construct – is not fictitious. 
Following from that assumption, I also understand that state-based identity, whilst being 
tangible in that it is connected directly with borders drawn on a map, also has an intangible 
―moral community‖ aspect, where those within the community feel a different set of moral 
obligations to those who are members compared to those outside (Anderson 1983/2006, 
Miller 1995:11).  In addition to the intangible, state-based identity also has real political 
claims.  Mobilization as a member of the state, whether in a democratic regime or not, means 
that there are political realities (rights and obligations and practical demands) associated with 
being a citizen. 
I also make some assumptions regarding globalization.  Globalization is happening 
right now.  It is a process, not a goal necessarily, multi-dimensional and reversible. 
Globalization spreads culture and values, those commonly noted include: democratic liberal 
institutionalism, individualism, capitalism, English as a common language for trade, 
technology, and education; global civil society with a focus on a multitude of issues that 
cannot usually be conquered one state at a time, for example, human rights, eradication of 
extreme poverty, the environment, and female equality issues.  Globalization is spread by the 
microelectronic revolution, and because of this, I assume our current globalizing influences 
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are substantively different from internationalism and primarily élite-level spread of normative 
changes of earlier interdependent epochs, as many more people, from all levels of society, 
participate in the interactions today than they did in the past. The reality of globalization does 
not alter that there are powerful localizing tendencies and I assume that it is possible to limit 
globalization. 
 
State-based Identity Theory 
 
Identity is mixed, constructed from a multiplicity of sources from ethnicity to gender, 
religion to favorite sports team, sexual orientation to hair color.  As long as a person can 
identify something that is the same or different about their relationship to others, it can 
become a source of identity. ―All identity construction requires the summoning of difference, 
the relativization of the self as against the ‗other‘ imagined as separate outside‖ (Kennedy 
2001:3). 
Identity is not inherently empowering, identities only become empowering when they 
are politicized.  Having a Muslim identity in France, for example, is highly politicized, 
having an Irish-American identity in America, is not (Kostboth 2011).  They become 
politicized by relating in a direct manner to external power structures (O‘Byrne 2001), such 
as belonging to a state in the international system. Therefore citizenship – a state-based 
identity – remains a powerful identity even as globalization spreads across the globe.  State- 
based identity remains salient for most people. Passports are issued by states. No matter how 
postinternational their individual global concerns are, in most cases to travel to a meeting 
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outside of local, individuals must show proof of their state-based identity.
10
   Travel 
requirements, visas, and accompanying paraphernalia are designated by one‘s state-based 
identity.
11
 
―Identity is not only socially constructed – it is pragmatically socially constructed‖ 
(O‘Byrne 2001:141).12 State-based identities are formed out of general factors: common 
language, historical heritage, ethnic origins and geographic location (Kennedy 2001:2).  
State-based collective identities in the form of nationalism provide ―a common culture 
against whose background people can make more individual decisions about how to lead 
their lives‖ pursue social justice, or foster understanding of the rules of the game (Miller 
1995:185). 
State-based identity is regularly assumed to be of equivalent strength in many 
approaches to understanding the link between globalization and identity.  Regarding 
globalization, the nexus of economics and politics has been focused on to the detriment of 
culture.  State-based identity has been left as a hypothetical constant – part of ―ceteris 
paribus‖ for most authors studying globalization.13 
It is critical to note that state-based identity is not equally strong across nation-states. 
―There are great variations between societies, both in strength of their national allegiances 
                                                 
10
 Certain areas, such as the EU‘s Schengen zone may waive this requirement – but only because state-
based identity has been proven in order to enter the zone to begin with. 
 
11
 Susan Strange (1994) refers to ―transnational managerial class‖(p. 138), and Scholte notes: 
―Commonalities of the group include global English, degrees from Northern universities, global 
professional attire, frequent flyer programmes, global job marketing, investments in global financial 
instruments, multiple citizenships, and children educated in international schools‖ (Scholte p. 246) – of 
course this just proves the point – multiple citizenships and frequent flyers are passports – links to the state-
based identity no matter how alike their clothing, tastes and preference for educating their children are. 
 
12
 Emphasis in original 
13
 Lieber and Weisberg (2002) note that the impact of globalization on culture is usually viewed as a ―side 
effect‖. (p.274) 
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and in the content of those allegiances‖ (Miller 1995:13).14 The historical development of 
states influences the strength of state-based identity today, and ―the depth and exclusivity of 
national identities varies greatly‖ (Wendt 1994: 387).  States that have had their state-based 
identity subjugated to others through domination by an empire are particularly important to 
study because state-based identity may have been preempted by an imperial identity.
15
   
The consequences of being subjugated by an empire may include being socialized 
against the indigenous identity – as maintaining a separate identity would seem to encourage 
adding wood to a nationalistic bonfire that could become inflamed against the imperial force. 
Therefore, the usual course undertaken by the dominant empire would be to make the 
indigenous identity appear backwards and weak – two characteristics emphasized during the 
modernization of the Soviet Union and the extension of Soviet power. 
 
Promulgation Through Socialization 
 
The first indicator of strength of state-based identity is to look at common culture – in 
terms of common sets of norms and values that are introduced to members of society through 
processes of socialization.  Socialization occurs through repeated exposure to customs, 
language, symbols and traditions that the collective deems necessary (though not specifically 
consciously) to pass to the next generation the acceptable ways of looking at the world.  At 
the collective level of state-based identity, this incorporates symbols of nationalism that link 
                                                 
14
 Emphasis in original 
 
15
 Empires do differ in this respect. Ancient Rome and the Ottoman Empire, for example, tolerated greater local 
identities than did the Soviet Union. 
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events of today with the collective memory of the past. This linkage is put into action in both 
symbolic and substantive ways. 
Symbolic efforts include public holidays and festivals, celebrations of distinct literary 
or art traditions such as Japanese Haiku, or Korean pottery. Substantive efforts are made with 
government legislation and education.  These efforts are accomplished through socialization, 
with contributions from both familial sources such as grandparents and non-personal media 
references, and are deepened by the formal education system – teaching cultural touchstones 
to students in the form of ―civics‖ or ―history‖ classes. 
Parades, for example, straddle the line between symbolic and substantive.  In some 
cases, the military may be displayed as a strong point of national pride. Others may be more 
celebratory, non-military, parades akin to American Fourth of July festivities.  A short walk 
along the Thames in central London shows how statues, prominently displayed in central 
locations, can provide semi-permanent reminders of important people and events that 
constitute past glories associated with the state.  Modes of unique heritage dress, perhaps not 
for the everyday, but for holiday events or special ceremonies such as wearing bunad to a 
traditional Norwegian wedding, also reinforce the way in which the collective asserts its 
specialness, socializing individuals to becoming members of the community. 
Language is second indicator of the strength of state-based identity.  Is the language 
of indigenous or the vestiges of empire, a language forcibly imported through imperialism or 
invasion?  Language is an indicator of who belongs to our communities.  Unlike identity 
based on inherited consanguinity, having command of a language is earned through effort, 
and subject to a much more felicitous determination of belonging (Dirks 1995). 
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An individual who speaks English, for example, can lay some claim to being 
understood by the nationals of countries all over the world where English is an official 
language and mother tongue.  Even within the context of speaking English, however, there 
are definite determinations of whether one is a member of a community that is local, or 
―other‖.  A native English speaker from New Zealand, for example, will be generally 
understood in the United States, but will clearly be regarded as an outsider due to exhibiting 
a ―funny‖ accent, and woe be to the traveler who orders a cup of tea and is presented with 
dark liquid in a tall glass, swirling with ice cubes.  Communication may be possible, but 
language differences do change the very way people think, and with that, their world.
16
   The 
question of who belongs in one‘s moral community may not boil down to the temperature of 
their tea, but tea may serve as an indicator, very quickly, of those who do not.  Language is 
not the only determinant however; collective identity is also molded through direct policies 
of the state. 
The third indicator of strength of state-based identity is state policies. These can be 
shaped directly by the political élites through education, cultural policy, and state 
interventions such as national holidays to reimagine collective identity. State policies by 
post-Soviet European states are enacted to encourage the general populace to abjure the 
identities foisted on them by the Soviets and to promote a sense of nationalism – a collective 
state-based identity. ―State-sponsored educational systems, the media, and élite-driven 
political ideologies communicate all these formal accoutrements of nationhood back to the 
people themselves‖ (King 2000:2). 
                                                 
16
 See Karl Deutch. 1969. Nationalism and its Alternatives New York: Random House for further elucidation on 
perception change through language. 
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Children learn about their state through education programming that reflects the 
identity constructs that the political élites wish to socialize the children into internalizing. To 
illustrate by dipping into material relevant to my forthcoming case studies, a Transnistrian 
textbook from 1997 describes the break-away republic‘s ―liberation‖ from Moldova: 
 
The traitorous, barbaric, and unprovoked invasion of Bender [by the Moldovan authorities] had a 
single goal: to frighten and bring to their knees the inhabitants of the Dnestr Republic, to make 
them shudder with terror. However, the people‘s bravery, steadfastness, and love of liberty saved 
the Dnestr Republic. The defense of Bender against the overwhelming forces of the enemy 
closed a heroic page in the history of our young republic. The best sons and daughters of the 
people sacrificed their lives for peace and liberty in our land.
17
 
 
Absorbing state history through education is one of the most socializing forces of 
identity formation within a polity. Through the process of being taught, students learn what it 
means to call themselves citizens of the state, and the imagined characteristics of the polity to 
which they should aspire.  As can be imagined, the Moldovan textbooks would reflect wildly 
differing accounts and emotive language regarding the rebels and their efforts that included 
taking arms against the government. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 N.V. Babilunga and V.G. Bomeshko, Pagini din istoria plaiului natal (Tiraspol: Transnistrian Institute of 
Continuing Education, 1997, p. 98) in King 2000. 
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State-based Identity and Globalization 
 
As globalization meets traditional cultural values in post-Soviet states, there occurs 
some hybridization of identities and cultures to meet the needs of the population. Must 
globalization always lead to distress for national culture or can government policies thwart 
the problems?  I suggest a counter-intuitive relationship between fighting to maintain 
national culture and globalization – that states with strong cultural protection measures 
supporting state-based identities will embrace globalization more than states without 
substantive cultural protection measures, as a weak state-based identity may lead to 
perception of ―global forces‖ as a threat.  To determine the strength of state-based identity I 
will subjectively assess the cultural protections identified above – a strong common culture, 
language differentiation, and state policies designed to reinforce collective loyalty at the state 
level. These three indicators of state-based identity together form a set of cultural protection 
measures by which a comparison can be made between states to judge the strength of their 
state-based identities. 
The circumstances under which these measures apply in this thesis will be limited to 
investigating cultural protections of states that had been under the domination of the Soviet 
empire to come up with the strength of state-based identity.  These circumstances are by 
definition only relevant to the 15 states that were a part of the Soviet Union, but are 
appropriate for a case comparison to investigate whether the theory is sound.  The theoretical 
linking of a strong state-based identity to increased engagement with globalization may be 
extrapolated beyond the sphere of the Soviet Union in future studies. 
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By investigating this relationship I will add to the discourse by explaining what other 
studies have not – the strength of state-based identity can help us understand states‘ response 
to globalization and their choice to embrace or inhibit globalization.  This leads to my central 
question: 
 
Does a state with a stronger state-based identity embrace globalization more than a state 
with a weaker state-based identity? 
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CHAPTER 4.  METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis is a qualitative assessment through structured and focused case 
comparison.  It is an exploration into how the strength of state-based identity affects the 
reaction to the contradictory yet concurrent forces of globalization and localization in post- 
Soviet European states in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  I utilize the 
KOF globalization index as a way of comparing the process of globalization in regards to 
individual states.  The index provides an overall globalization ranking, breaking down the 
analysis into three different dimensions of globalization – Social, Economic, and Political.18 
I provide a figure illustrating globalization score trends with the case-study sections of the 
paper as a ready reference to see how each state has been progressing towards a more 
globalized outlook since the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
I selected post-Soviet European states because the collapse of the Soviet Union 
affords a rare opportunity to assess identity with a concrete date of change that can be 
associated with multiple countries at once to begin a case comparison.  Most social science 
experiment-by-observation-by-country cases only occur one at a time, so having all the 
countries in the study becoming masters of their own fate at the same time holds many 
factors constant.  Although the scope of this research is geographically limited, it will add to 
the literature on state-based identity formation and will contribute to the understanding of the 
human reaction to globalization. 
 
                                                 
18
 Summary of KOF globalization indices and variables weights is included in the appendix 
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Dimensions of Globalization 
 
In assessing globalization there are three indices that are benchmarks for country 
comparisons: The A. T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Index, the Swiss think tank KOF, and CSGR 
(Warwick University). Each of these provides an overall globalization ranking or score, and 
breaks down the analysis into three different dimensions of globalization – ―Social,‖ 
―Economic,‖ and ―Political.‖19 I find the KOF Index to be of the most use in this analysis 
overall, for the depth of information and the ability to translate it into cultural applications. 
A quick overview from KOF is necessary to understand what is being measured and how the 
index is calculated: 
2011 KOF Index of Globalization 
The KOF Index of Globalization … defines globalization to be the process of 
creating networks of connections among actors at multi-continental distances, 
mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, 
capital and goods.  Globalization is conceptualized as a process that erodes 
national boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies and 
governance and produces complex relations of mutual interdependence. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 The Kearney index has four dimensions, Economic, Political, Personal and Technology, but ―Personal‖ 
and ―Technology‖ are best viewed in combination to better compare with the equivalent measures of 
―social‖ in the other two indices. 
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Method of Calculation 
In constructing the indices of globalization, each of the variables [are] 
transformed to an index on a scale of one to hundred, where hundred is the 
maximum value for a specific variable over the period 1970 to 2007 and one  
is the minimum value. Higher values denote greater globalization. The data is 
transformed according to the percentiles of the original distribution…Data are 
calculated on a yearly basis…The indices on economic, social and political 
globalization as well as the overall index are calculated employing the 
weighted individual data series.20 
 
The dimensions are discussed individually in the next three sub-sections. 
 
Economic Globalization 
The KOF index defines economic globalization as ―long distance flows of goods, 
capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market 
exchanges.‖21 
Globalization is often thought of solely as an economic process: ―The globalization of 
finance, demand, supply, and competition form a series of interlocking currents of global 
circulation of information.‖22  Economic globalization is 37% of a country‘s overall score as 
measured by the KOF index, with varying weights being applied to both the actual flows of 
                                                 
20
 KOF  http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method_2010.pdf   (A  more  detailed  breakdown  of  the 
variables may be located in the appendix) 
21
 KOF http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method_2010.pdf 
 
22
 Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2009) p.9 
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trade, FDI, portfolio investment, income, and the restrictions of hidden import barriers, mean 
tariff rates, taxes on international trade and capital account restrictions. 
 
Political Globalization 
Political globalization accounts for 25% of a country‘s overall KOF score. It is 
measured in the KOF Index by recording the number of embassies in country, membership in 
international organizations, participation in UN Security Council Missions and the number of 
international treaties signed by the country since 1945. 
 
Social Globalization 
Manfred Steger notes that ―globalization is also a linguistic and ideological 
practice,‖23  as opposed to finding globalization as ―merely a set of material processes 
anchored in economics and technology.  It is also reflected in conflicting systems of ideas 
and claims…that define, describe, and evaluate the process.‖24   Ideas spread through social 
contacts.  The KOF index defines social globalization as the spread of ideas, information, 
images, and people.
25
 
Social globalization index scores add up to 38% of overall globalization score and 
take into account measures that include, tourists, phone calls, internet users, trade in books 
and newspapers, international mail, and also includes the per capita number of IKEA stores 
and McDonald‘s restaurants.  While one can measure directly the cost of a Big Mac in these 
countries and count how many are purchased, there is the shared universal experience of 
                                                 
23
 Steger, M. (2009) p.18 
24
 Steger, M. (2009) p.ix 
25
 KOF http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/method_2010.pdf 
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eating at a McDonald‘s that is harder to both qualify and quantify as a driver of globalization. 
Likewise, does one purchase a coffee table at IKEA because the prices are so reasonable, or 
does having Swedish furniture make one feel more cosmopolitan? 
 
Discussion of Case Selection 
 
To decide on the case selection I began with the15 post-Soviet states as these states 
were all thrust onto the global stage at the same time at the end of the Soviet Union.  This 
makes them ripe for analysis as a set of cases that would be developing the identity and 
globalization levels that I am concerned with, in a comparable way.  This is not to say that all 
the cases would be starting from the exact same base, but they would be broadly comparable, 
having shared the experience of being a part of the Soviet Union.  I further narrowed the 
cases by geographic region, choosing to assess cases that border Europe, as globalizing 
influences would be less comparable given infrastructure differences and the physical 
separation of more removed states. 
Cases for a more controlled comparison must have some similarities and some 
differences to test my theory, the remaining states could be divided into two groups: Baltic 
states and non- Baltic states. 
 
  Baltic states    Non-Baltic states 
Estonia   Belarus  
Latvia    Moldova 
Lithuania   Ukraine 
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Small states are relevant to identity constructs because smaller states may 
demonstrate a more homogenous identity rather than an existing melting pot of differences a 
larger state may present which would give significant advantages in maintaining social 
cohesion to smaller states. To be clear in the comparisons of state-based identity then, the 
implicit heterogeneity should be controlled by the states in the comparison being either both 
geographically large or both small.  To decide this question of size I turned to traditional 
globalization discourse which sets the likelihood of geographically small countries to be 
more globalized than large countries.  Holding size constant will help the case comparison. 
By choosing to focus on small states for their relevance to both of my variables of interest, I 
removed the two larger states, Belarus, with a land area of 207,600 km
2
, and Ukraine at 
603,00km
2
. Additionally, Belarus and Ukraine were also founding members of the USSR, 
which would have made them identity providers of the Soviet-style identity rather than the 
other states bordering Europe who had Soviet-style identity foisted on them. 
The states that remained were all small states with a territory of less than 50,000km
2 
with the 1991 borders. They were all victims of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which 
gave them an entry point into the Soviet identity sphere at the same time.  Moldova was the 
only non-Baltic state left so it was selected to work as a point of comparison to a Baltic state. 
Estonia was selected as the Baltic state because, like Moldova, the transition to independence 
was non-violent and a violent uprising would have had very different identity ramifications 
that are outside the scope of this study.
 
With the cases selected, I then move on to describe the factors that will be assessed in 
the case studies. These factors are not an exhaustive list, but represent what I perceive to be 
the most salient points at this initial stage of investigation. Several minor factors are 
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implicitly taken into account through case selection. Other factors may be of importance to 
globalization or to identity – but not to both – in these instances I leave those factors for other 
studies to focus on my central case. 
 
Factors to Account for in Case Studies 
 
Each of the case studies will be structured in the same way to encourage clarity of 
comparison. The factors are divided under the following subheadings: 
 
History of the state 
 
A historical narrative is necessary for both these cases to place the state-based 
identity development in context.  Variation is expected across the cases in the historical 
development of their state, and corresponding state-based identity.  The history of each state 
–including years as an independent state – gives the reader a good idea of how much of an 
independent state-based identity existed before Russian/Soviet domination of state and 
identity. 
 
Forging a nation 
 
Striking a balance between the historical narratives and developing the theoretical 
connections is best accomplished by separately looking at factors that blend historical detail 
with analysis relevant analysis to identity or globalization and then to how they both are 
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connected.  Keeping in mind the nature of predominant society values and thinking in terms 
of perceptions, goals, strategies and values.  This section will also review the number of local 
(state) holiday celebrations as nationalistic celebrations such as public holidays and other 
―contrived displays of national solidarity‖ (Miller 1995:15) are important to get a feel for 
what the collective values at the state level. 
 
Language 
 
Language is an excellent determination of who belongs and who is an outsider to our 
communities.  If language laws are in effect in a state, there is national identity fighting to 
against an outside ―other‖ and it will be interesting to find out if there is a connection 
between a state‘s level of embracing globalization and the cultural protectionism of official 
language laws.  I would also expect that a strict adherence to national language leads to a 
strong state-based identity as a salient identity.  The language sections are additionally 
divided into two sub-sections: Identity and Language, and Globalization and Language. 
 
Education 
 
Education is important to investigations into both identity and globalization. 
 
For identity: According to Steven D. Roper, one of the most important factors in identity 
formation is education (Roper 2005: 503).  The education system socializes group identity, 
during the Russification of Soviet-controlled states, the education system was used to inhibit 
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indigenous identities and promote Russian language and Soviet ideology and ideals through 
socialization. 
 
For Globalization: If English is assumed to be the ―Lingua Global‖, to what level has this 
permeated the education system (following my expectation of a country where 10% speak 
English will be less engaged with globalization than a country where 50% speak English). 
According to Robert McCrum, ―Globish,‖ a neutral and intelligible form of English is the 
language of the global community (McCrum 2010).  
In 1987 Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore, continuing his ―English First‖ 
program took the additional step from encouraging students to learn English to requiring all 
students to take English classes, English – or the Singaporean version known as ―Singlish‖ 
(McCrum 2010: 273) became a common language to the students no matter if at home they 
spoke Chinese, Malay, or Indian. The accessibility of English will indicate tendencies 
towards a global outlook, a lack of English education will indicate that joining the world 
stage is less important to state policies at this time. 
 
State policy choices 
 
Does the state favor globalization or not? What are the policies followed (or even as 
interesting – not followed), and are there local backlashes – localization?  I expect to find 
globalization-favoring policies in states with a stronger pre-existing state-based identity as 
they will not feel threatened by globalizing forces.  We must keep in mind, however, that ―as 
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people and organizations experience the losses of autonomy and authority that accompany 
globalization, so do they seek to protect their interests and achieve psychic comfort by 
reverting to the more close-at-hand groups with which they are affiliated.‖26  This will lead to 
noticeable localizations that will influence identity formation within the state. 
 
Global or Local? Contextual Analysis of a Key Issue 
 
Each case study will also delve into a specific issue. For Estonia, looking at the 2007 
cyber attack as an example of a contextual issue of embracing globalization, and for 
Moldova, looking at the Transnistrian internal strife, ongoing since the early 1990s as an 
issue of localization.  These specific issues shed light on the context by which these cases 
need to be considered as they illustrate the state-based identity of each state and the direction 
of concern of state policies – external embrace of globalizing influences in the case of 
Estonia, and a powerful localizing issue in the case of Moldova.  Both of these in depth 
analyses connect to the level of state-based identity and to the level of globalization engaged 
by the state. 
 
Globalization ranking and discussion 
 
The research in these sections will be reporting the globalization rankings and 
changes in rankings since 1991.  I will seek any potential connection between a stronger 
state-based identity (local influence) and level of globalization (global influence), as 
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documented in the state rankings of the KOF Globalization index in each of the three 
dimensions (economic, social, and political). 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The conclusion for each case will provide a recapitulation of pertinent factors that 
need to be assessed for state-based identity and globalization. 
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CHAPTER 5.  ESTONIA 
 
History of the State
27
 
Since the thirteenth century Estonians have been rallying around their national 
identity in opposition to having been conquered by Denmark, Germany, Poland, Sweden, and 
finally Russia.  Each subjugating force influenced the development of Estonia, and vestiges 
of the past are incorporated into the present – Capital city Tallinn, for example, derives its 
name from Taani linn, which means ―Danish city‖ in Estonian, the Danes having conquered 
in 1219.  German rule from the fourteenth century ended with the Ivan IV the Terrible 
attacking in 1558, wars and control by Polish and Swedish forces followed with the short 
lived Swedish rule (1629-1721) significantly improving education opportunities and securing 
other rights for peasants.  Russian control after 1721 included the implementation of serfdom 
as part of the social order, and their nominal emancipation in 1816 changed very little of their 
lives. 
From 1860-1885 Estonian national identity was actively shaped through the 
establishment of cultural traditions – such as song festivals – and literary traditions began to 
develop.  Uniting characteristics that were distinctly different from their rulers of the past, the 
―Time of National Awakening,‖ Ärkamisaeg,28 forged the bonds of Estonian state-based 
identity highlighting cultural touchstones that were important to the people regardless of the 
titular rulers of the state – from the past, present, and importantly, the future.  The 
Russification campaign that commenced in 1885 severely constrained national identity 
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formation across Russian-controlled areas including Estonia.  From the end of the 
Russification period at the turn of the century through the collapse of the Russian empire 
during World War I, a small seed of national sentiment again began to grow. 
Estonia became an independent democratic republic on February 24, 1918.  With the 
1920 Tartu Peace Treaty, Soviet Russia renounced authority over the lands of Estonia and the 
people within.  After subjugation by outsiders for so long, Estonians determined to allow 
cultural differences to be respected, thus granted autonomy to all minorities of over 3000 
individuals, including the Jewish population, in a move that was unique in Western Europe. 
Politically, stability was harder to come by, with three constitutions being adopted before 
World War II switched the focus of politics from within to without.  The political situation, 
unfortunately, would not be decided domestically.  The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 
gave control of Estonia to the Soviet Union in return for German control over most of 
Poland.  In August 1940, the U.S.S.R. proclaimed Estonia a part of the Soviet Union.  This 
annexation was never formally recognized by the western powers; nonetheless, Estonian 
nationalism was without a voice for almost 50 years. 
In the years 1987 to 1991, thousands of Estonians sang banned national songs in 
vociferous public gatherings during the ―Singing Revolution.‖  This reassertion of state-
based identity through the display of cultural sovereignty in Estonia reverberated through the 
population, with students and faculty at the fore.  The subject of history had become ―one of 
the first battlefields for the liberation movement‖ (Laar 2004:227), and students began 
meeting regularly in Tallinn as members of the Estonian Heritage Society – reusing methods 
and slogans from the first period of independence during the interwar years as a link to the 
goals of independence once more.  State-based identity was being heralded even before 
43 
 
Estonia became independent again as articles published by Mati Hint, in defense of the 
Estonian language, invigorated national sentiment of Estonians.  In the spring of 1987, the 
History and Law faculty at Tartu University met to discuss proposed Soviet expansion of the 
phosphorous mine in Estonia. The ―aula meeting‖ (aula meaning ―main hall‖) led to 
traditional demonstrations on 1 May 1987 with yellow t-shirts proclaiming ―Phosphorite – 
No Thanks‖ becoming very popular (Laar 2004).  Mart Laar, who went on to become Prime 
Minister of Estonia years later, describes the scene in Tartu on the night of 15 April 1988, as 
a member of the Estonian Students Society: 
In front of the university, the torches were already burning.  And then I saw the flags. 
Or rather, they were not really flags but strips of blue, black and white cloth which 
had been sewn together and from which pieces were then cut and given to everyone 
who wanted one.  And suddenly everywhere was full of blue, black and white.
29
 
 
The electricity that charged the students and crowds around Mart Laar that evening 
did not dim in the coming months.  By June the Singing Revolution had connected young 
Estonians to the patriotic songs of their past and to each other in a movement that continued 
to shine a light on independence – culminating with a rally of  300, 000 people gathering at 
the Festival Grounds in Tallinn to sing the ―Songs of Estonia‖ on September 11, 1988. 
The Singing Revolution was followed by ―The Baltic Chain.‖  The Baltic Chain, 
though not limited to Estonians, was a well-organized human chain, comprised of 
approximately two million individuals holding hands over a distance of  330 miles from 
Tallinn Estonia, through Riga, the capital of Latvia, and onto Vilnius Lithuania on August 
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23, 1989, in a peaceful but striking protest for independence for all three of the Baltic 
States.
30
   Independent Estonia was recognized on September 6, 1991. 
 
Forging a Nation 
 
Recognition of a collective identity of the Estonians has been affirmed since Johann 
Gottfried Herder, a German philosopher, poet, and Lutheran minister who visited Riga from 
1764 to 1769, noted that the peasants celebrated an oral tradition that was different from the 
land-owning classes.  He believed that the oral traditions revealed national spirits, and was 
one of the first theorists to link language to thought.  Herder focused on language and 
cultural traditions, and inspired others to do the same.  By 1839 oral traditions were being 
recorded and promoted in the form of epic poetry, with Friedrich Faehlmann and Friedrich 
Kreutzwald attempting to rebuild remnants of heroic poems into one grand epic Kalevipoeg 
through 1861. 
The veracity of  Kalevipoeg as a legitimate literary heritage of Estonia has been 
questioned, but Kalevipoeg inspired intellectual dedication to the ideal of nationalism and 
identity based on language that is more central to Estonian identity than descent, religion, or 
place of birth (Dirks 1995).  Russification efforts during both periods of rule attempted to 
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thwart national sentiments by requiring the language of both education and government be 
conducted solely in Russian (Sillaste 1995), which may explain why language is so symbolic 
of state-based identity in Estonia today.  Other symbols of state-based identity are used in 
forging a nation.  Physical objects like flags (as noted by Mart Laar‘s reminiscences above), 
national monuments, and uniforms can inspire loyalty for what they represent. Non-tangible 
efforts can also buttress the sentiment of the public towards the state.  Public holidays (a 
partial list follows), combine a sense of legitimacy with celebration, reaffirming the sense of 
identity being tied to the development of the state. 
 
National celebrations/Public Holidays in Estonia
31
 
Publicly celebrated holidays with history and/or descriptions (Day off) 
Jan 1  New Year‘s Day 
Feb 24  Independence Day: Celebrates declaration of independence in 1918 
June 23 Victory Day: Celebrates victory in the Battle of Vőnnu during the Estonian 
war of Independence (1918-1920). 
June 24 St. John‘s Day/Midsummer Day 
August 20 Day of Restoration of Independence: Celebrates Estonia‘s restoration of 
independence in 1991 
 
National holidays (no day off) 
Feb 2  Anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty: Treaty that ended Estonian War of 
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Independence 
March 14 Native Language Day 
June 4  National Flag Day: Flag of Estonia first consecrated 1884 
June 14 Day of Mourning and Commemoration: Commemorates victims of Soviet 
deportations in 1941 and 1949 
September 22  Resistance Fighting Day: 1944 Occupation by Soviet troops 
November 16  Day of Declaration of Sovereignty: Estonian declaration of sovereignty, 1988 
 
State-based identity is reinforced through the many important dates that have special 
meaning to Estonians; rather than having just one day on which being an independent state is 
trumpeted, Estonia celebrates contributions to independence six days each year.  However, 
just because a celebratory date is marked on a calendar does not necessarily translate as a 
measure of popular support of the state.
32
   Nonetheless, it does show a commitment by the 
state to reinforcing identity, and is used as a socialization tool by the state. 
 
Language 
Identity and Language 
Culture and identity are preserved through language (Küün 2010).  Language is the 
factor that holds the most importance for state-based identity in Estonia.  Article  3 of the 
Language Act stipulates Estonian to be the only official language of government.  Russian, 
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 After all, just because it is an official date on the calendar, Americans do not stop work every June 7th to 
celebrate National Chocolate Ice Cream Day, for example, but do celebrate Independence Day on July 4th 
commemorating their sovereign independence – an enthusiastically supported holiday that reinforces state- 
based identity as a salient feature of Americans‘ collective identity. 
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the second most commonly used language, does not have official status, and requests since 
the mid-1990s for special permission to use it to be able to communicate efficiently with 
local people in Narva and Sillamäe (where Estonian speakers make up only 4.9% and 4.3% 
of the population respectively) have not been granted (Euromosaic).  The 2000 census had 
67% of the population speaking Estonian as their first language, with Russian speakers 
accounting for 30%.
33
  Language is so important to the state-based identity of Estonians that 
it weaves through each of the other sections in this case study. 
 
Globalization and Language 
Lorenza Fonzari posits that for Estonians, learning English is more than just a way to 
communicate at the global level.  English has taken on a symbolic value and represents 
―freedom‖ – the voices of freedom heard on the radio during the years as part of the Soviet 
empire (Fonzari 1999: 40).  There is also a willingness to communicate with Russian 
members of society (and of Russians wanting to communicate with Estonians) where 
speaking in the language of the other is so politically baggage-laden that choosing to speak 
English to each other facilitates getting things done even at the local level.  Results from a 
survey of schoolchildren in Estonia showed 85.4% desiring to learn more English as a tool to 
communicate in travels and because it was seen as necessary in order to enjoy the global 
entertainment industry. 
Because of the links to psychological identity constructs, learning English is not seen 
as threatening to Estonian identity – it is viewed in a way that reinforces Estonia‘s 
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independence.  In other areas of the world as well, not just post-Soviet states English 
language skills are a tool of globalization and not a threat to state-based identity.  In Korea, 
for example, the students of the Korean Minjok Leadership Academy (KMLA) , a school that 
―aspires to be Korea‘s version of Eton‖34 all classes except Korean language and history are 
taught in English to better prepare the students for global leadership. The school also strongly 
emphasizes Korean state-based identity through policies that include students being required 
to learn at least one traditional music or sport (Shin 2003).  Like Korean students, learning 
English in Estonia is a tool in the tool-box for engaging globalizing forces – not a threat to 
the state-based identity of Estonians. 
 
State Policies 
 
Education 
The education system in Estonia is intertwined with language regulation. A strong 
factor in Estonia‘s state-based identity, socialization through education not only focuses on 
the content of schoolwork but also in the language used for education.  In 1997, The Law on 
Basic and Secondary Schools designated Estonian as the only language of secondary school 
classrooms.  Objections by international monitors led to an amendment in 2000 to be 
implemented by 2007, that all secondary schools will be considered ―Estonian language 
institutions‖ where 60% of classes must be taught in Estonian, and the other 40% given, if 
necessary, to instruction in other languages. 
35
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Becoming a Citizen 
Becoming a citizen of Estonia at independence was revealing of the importance held 
by the use of language in identity politics and the primacy of language to the state-based 
identity.  Estonia‘s ―most pointed response to what Stalin wrought‖ (Levy 2010) resulted in 
approximately 75,000 stateless people living in Estonia, some of them born and raised there, 
that did not meet the requirement for citizenship – granted mostly to those who had it before 
the Soviet takeover and their descendents (Feldman 2005).  Ethnic Russians who moved to 
Estonia (or whose parents moved to Estonia before they were born) are victims of de- 
Russification, so much so that they could not be classed as minorities in Estonia.  By 1992, 
the law defined minorities in terms of citizens; in this case it meant that if an individual was 
not a citizen, then they had no minority rights.  84.2 percent of the population in Estonia are 
citizens and 12.9 percent are Russian citizens.  Since 2000, in order to become a citizen, 
applicants must take the Estonian Language Examination.  Regarded by many as one of the 
more difficult languages to learn (having 14 cases for example), this is a restrictive enough 
barrier that it has become an issue between Estonia and the EU with Estonia not ratifying the 
Charter for Minority Languages.  Dual citizenship is not permitted in Estonia.  The Estonian 
Integration Strategy specifies the ―strengthening of the state identity‖ as one of its core 
principles.
36
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Global or Local? 
Estonian Cyber-attacks 
The in-depth analysis offered in this case shows that Estonia is focused on 
globalizing, outside forces, rather than internal divisions like Moldova – the second case 
study.  The technological revolution is often seen as specifically globalizing, and so 
technology is where the focus shall be for this section.  Estonia is a leader in internet 
connectivity at both the individual and state levels.  With 93 percent of EU companies and 51 
percent of Europeans using the internet in 2007,
37
 a comparatively high 99 percent of 
Estonians participate in online banking (Evron, Aarelaid 2008).  Even elections for 
parliament had over 30,000 people voting from home via the internet (Evron, 2008).  More 
than 85 percent of Estonians file their tax returns online (Tighe 2007).  Estonia ranks 155th 
in terms of population, yet is so tech-savvy that it ranks 48th for internet hosts.
38
   The state 
website proudly notes under ―five surprising facts about Estonia‖ that ―Skype‖ was invented 
there.
39
 
Estonia came under cyber-attack beginning 26 April 2007 and experienced ―one of 
the most serious large-scale cyber-attacks against sovereign states‖ (EU Ministerial 
Conference 2009). Beginning at 10:00 pm and ―fueled with step-by-step instructions so 
simple that any Internet user could follow‖ (Evron 2008:123) the attack commenced. 
Through 18 May more than 120 attacks were recorded in Estonia.  The DDoS (distributed 
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denial of service) attacks were launched by botnets – computers that had been hijacked by a 
malicious code to become zombie machines under the control of a remote user.
40
  Resulting, 
inter alia, in bringing down the internet connection to the biggest bank in Estonia, 
―Hansapank,‖ people were unable to pay by bankcard for approximately 95 minutes; a 
societal disaster in a state where everything, including ―gasoline, milk and bread,‖ is usually 
paid for by bankcard (Lobjakas 2008).  The Estonian parliament was without email for four 
days (Landler and Markoff 2007), as the machines were overloaded with 100 to 1000 times 
the usual traffic (Evron, Aarelaid 2008). 
Adam Lebor, reporting for The Times (London), said, ―It was only a few years ago 
that political disputes in eastern Europe were settled by bullets … and cyberwar by YouTube 
is much safer than the real thing.‖41   Yet his statement should be reassessed in the light of 
the attack on Estonia, as while bullets did not fly through the streets of Tallinn, the impact of 
the attacks was significantly disruptive to the lives of the individuals in the state.  Cyber-
attacks by ―hacktivists‖42 may be of greater concern now that the ability of hackers to do real 
damage, albeit temporarily, to the e-infrastructure of a state has been revealed.  For Estonia, 
their infrastructure was helped by the fact that they could block their external servers 
quickly– though this could only happen in a linguistically specific country – they simply 
blocked servers to any language other than Estonian.
43
   Localization in this case was a very 
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important defense against a globalized cyberspace strike, Estonian language supporting a 
very real victory for the state. 
 
Globalization in Estonia 
 
Figure 1. Globalization in Estonia. 
 
The KOF index scores, displayed in the table above, show that Estonia is a globalized 
state in all dimensions.  To give some context to the numbers, of 156 countries ranked, 
Estonia ranks 8th in economic globalization, 31st for social globalization, 78th for political 
globalization and has an overall globalization ranking of 24th.  The KOF score changes from 
1991 to 2008 are striking.  In economic globalization, Estonia transformed from a score of 58 
in 1991 to 89.2 in 2008.  In social globalization, Estonia started in 1991 at a score of 48.7 and 
moved up to 75.2 by 2008.  The grandest change was in the political globalization score, 
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Estonia began with a score of only 12.6 and in 2008 had reached 75 – with the score potential 
ranging from 0-100 potential this increase means that Estonia‘s changes in this section are 
astounding.  As discussed in the previous section, Estonia is very active globally in cyber- 
security as a result of being the victim of the first major cyber-attack on any sovereign state. 
Estonia now takes a global lead in the fight for e-infrastructure preparedness.  The most 
successful step forward as a result of the Estonian attack has been the EU declaring the 
internet as critical infrastructure.  Critical infrastructure protection is necessary, as increased 
connectivity is important to any discussion of globalization (Nederveen Pieterse 2009).  In 
Estonia 72.3 out of every 100 people are internet users (World Bank), helping to boost their 
KOF social globalization index score to 31 in the world rankings, making them the highest 
ranked post-Soviet state.  Being a post-Soviet state is fundamental to the approach Estonia 
takes to globalization – open and welcoming to the West – with strong cultural protections in 
place to ensure state-based identity remains strong. 
In 2004, Estonian diplomat Jüri Luik, ambassador to NATO, Belgium, and the 
U.S.A., Jean-Jacques Subrenat, French ambassador to Estonia (1998-2002) and Harri Tiido, 
ambassador to NATO, discussed the relationship of globalization to national identity.
44
  They 
identify globalization as a benefit to Estonians because the global exchange of information 
leads to the heightened awareness of Estonia on the world stage.  This is perceived through 
two lenses immediately, first that Estonians have more opportunity to become successful 
business people through contacts with the global market which is considered advantageous to 
the state as a whole.  Secondly, the global exchange of information is seen as a boon to their 
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security interests, safety being implied by the fact that if a country was to invade Estonia no 
country could claim, ―unfortunately we were not aware of what was going on‖ (Luik et al. 
2004: 281). 
In the course of this debate, the EU was assumed to be a mechanism of globalization, 
continuing the theoretical link to the transformationalist school discussed in chapter two of 
this thesis (recall that skeptics would not consider regional institutions part of globalization). 
As an instrument of globalization, debate of the relationship between the EU and state-based 
identities is an important consideration to the argument presented in this thesis on the link 
between state-based identity and the embrace of globalization. The EU is a political entity 
made up of Member States with specific considerations in place for cultural, economic, and 
social issues. 
When questioned about EU collective identity ―leaving its mark‖ on small states like 
Estonia, Luik concludes that it is likely that through foreign exposure young people may find 
it harder to arouse patriotism than older generations have in the past.   Nevertheless, that does 
not mean they are any less Estonian, he goes on to note.  On the other hand, Subrenat finds 
the EU to be reinforcing of state identities, especially the ―psychologically important‖ ability 
for states to enter EU agreements in its own mother tongue.  He emphasizes that this 
maintains language as an important part of national identity (Luik et al. 2004: 286).  When 
asked if he felt more like a European or a former Soviet, Luik states that he is Estonian. 
Subrenat goes even further – he claims the idea of a European Union identity is fallacious – 
that state identities make up the EU and will continue to keep their separate identities as long 
as Member States place a high level of importance to preserving their own cultural and 
linguistic identity.  The EU is not the only International Governmental Organization (IGO) 
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with geographic salience for Estonia and which it is a member, the other highly significant 
membership is in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
NATO is a security concern, set up to protect territory and democracy.  There are no 
sections of the treaty relating to cultural integration, or social issues of identity in NATO. 
Whilst there may be connections to globalization with NATO, the connection to identity is 
tenuous; at best, NATO is a tool to protect identity, but it is not involved in the creation of 
identity (Luik et al. 2004: 289).  Looking at NATO from a philosophical standpoint however, 
Tiido points out that questions of identity are defended and preserved by a safe and secure 
state, so that in some sense NATO and the defense of the state that being a member to the 
treaty envisions, really does connect to identity (Tiido, in Luik et al. 2004: 290). 
The European Monitoring Centre on Change reports in ―Perceptions of globalization: 
attitudes and responses in the EU‖ from March 2008, that Estonian mid – to upper-level 
management individuals feel positive towards policies that welcome globalization: giving a 
5.3 rating (with 1 being the most negative and 6 being the most positive feeling), to 
regulations that allow foreign ownership of domestic companies, with Estonian government 
support of foreign investors rated at 5.06.  The overall attitude towards globalization was 
rated at 4.10, attenuated by the perceived threat of relocation of industries, R&D, and 
services. 
 
Conclusion 
Continuity is important for identity formation to hold up over the longue durée.  No 
matter who maintained political control over them, from Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and 
finally Russia, Estonians have celebrated their state-based identity, exemplified through their 
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prioritization of their language as their most salient national characteristic.  This case study 
has shown that Estonia‘s cultural protections are high: all three factors that determine state- 
based identity are strong.  Firstly, Estonia celebrates a common culture, focused on song 
festivals and literary traditions.  Secondly, the Estonian language is differentiated from all 
others, not imposed on the population and is the fundamental backbone to answering what it 
means to be Estonian.  State policies, the third factor, reinforce language through mandating 
60% of classes be taught in Estonian. Becoming a citizen of Estonia is very difficult and is, 
once again, reinforced through language requirements.  Through these cultural protections I 
conclude that Estonia has a strong state-based identity. 
Turning then to globalization, I find Estonia, as expected, to be welcoming of 
globalizing influences.  Estonia‘s political globalization ranking is fourth out of other post- 
Soviet states.  Estonia ranks the highest in economic, social, and overall globalization levels 
out of all the former states of the Soviet Union in the KOF Globalization Index.  With 
favorable ratings for being a Member State of the EU, 52 % in favor (Eurobarometre 73, 
Spring 2010), embracing globalization through the EU is confidently approached by Estonia, 
trust levels reported of the EU is high at 68%, especially when the average EU Member State 
trusts the EU only 42%.  Even after coming under a cyber-attack, Estonia looks outward to 
the world. I find Estonia to have a strong state-based identity and because of that to be very 
willing to engage with the processes of globalization. 
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CHAPTER 6. MOLDOVA 
 
History of the State
45
 
Moldova is located in a well-worn corridor that conquerors have passed through for 
centuries.  Romans, Huns, Bulgars, and the Mongols all laid claims to the region from the 1st 
to the 14th centuries.  Dimitrie Cantemir provides a description (ca. 1714) 
46
 of how Moldova 
came to be named: Dragoş, a Romanian prince, lost his favourite dog ―Molda‖ who, during a 
fight with an auroch (a wild European bison), drowned in a river.  The river and surrounding 
lands were named after the dog and Dragoş took the auroch‘s likeness for his personal crest. 
The auroch-head remains a symbol on the seals of both Romania and Moldova today, an 
example of a shared history that we will see hinders the development of state-based identity 
for Moldova today.  During the 15th century Ştefan cel Mare (the Great) held off the 
Ottoman Empire‘s advances and attacks – efforts that led to his canonization by the 
Romanian Orthodox Church in the 20th century.  Ştefan died in 1504, by 1513 Moldova had 
become a tributary state of the Ottoman Empire. 
From the 16th to the 18th century the culture and identity of Moldova changed 
substantially.  Following the adage that pictures are worth a thousand words, Charles King 
notes that the changing portraiture of the rulers of Moldova has quite descriptive power: 
―Portraits of Ştefan the Great show a typical medieval knight indistinguishable from his 
contemporaries in England or France, but portraits of his successors two centuries later depict 
rulers clad in the flowing robes and elaborate turbans of Turkish pashas.‖(King 2000:16). 
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Wars between the Austrians, Russians, and Ottomans through the 18th century 
culminated in Moldova coming under Russian rule from 1812-1918.  With the fall of the 
Tsar, and the Bolshevik Revolution, the Moldovan Democratic Republic of Bessarabia 
declared a short-lived independence January 24, 1918.  By March 27 that same year, 
however, Moldova was united with Romania.  Greater Romania existed until the secret 
protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed by the Russians and the Germans in 
August 1939, were exposed by their enactment – the Soviets seized Moldova, June 26-28, 
1940, and the borders for the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) were settled 
between August and November 1940. 
Fifty years of Soviet rule came to an end on May 23, 1991 when the Parliament of the 
Republic of Moldova declared Moldovan independence from the U.S.S.R.  However, 
Moldova had a rough transition to democracy due to factors that included an ineffective 
Parliament, the lack of a new constitution, and two internal conflicts: a separatist movement 
that declared a "Transnistrian Moldovan Republic" in September 1990 based on territorially- 
based factors, and an ethnic conflict with the Gagauz minority.  The Gagauz were granted 
local autonomy in 1994.
47
  The Transnistria conflict (covered later in this thesis in more 
detail) remains unresolved today, though the violence that characterized the conflict in the 
early 1990s has subsided. 
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Forging a Nation – or National Forgery?48 
While the other case study in this thesis – Estonia – was rousing long-dormant 
identities that had been smothered by the communist identity of the Soviet Union, atavistic 
nationalism did not awaken naturally from its Soviet-enforced slumber in Moldova.  ―It was 
a republic that had no clear historical antecedent within the same borders‖ (King 2000:224). 
Following a different path than most post-Soviet states, rather than political mobilization by 
calling forth symbols indigenous to the people with unique Moldovan attributes, the primary 
political focus was to grab a hold of the characteristics and symbols of their neighboring 
nation – Romania.  Already speaking the same language as Romania, the written form was 
changed from Cyrillic script to the Latin script of their western neighbor in 1989, and with 
independence in 1991 Moldova adopted the flag and national anthem of Romania.  Moldova 
was the only republic of the Soviet Union to have a population that was culturally bound to 
its neighbor, with truly irredential potential.  Although political calls for unification with 
Romania were heard from many places, eventually an existence as a separate state became 
more enticing to the political élites than ―going home‖ to Romanian control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 I owe this heading to Charles King, who asks: ―how far can ethnic identities be forged without their 
appearing a forgery‖? (King 2000: 5) 
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National celebrations/Public Holidays in Moldova 
 
Jan 1 New Year‘s Day 
Jan7 Orthodox Christmas 
Mar 8 International Women‘s Day  
April 25 Easter Monday (Orthodox) 
May 1 Labour Day 
May 9 Victory and Commemoration Day 
Aug 27 Independence Day 
Aug 31 Limba Noastră (National Language Day) 
 
Compared to Estonia, there are very few celebratory days that reinforce cultural 
associations that are unique to Moldova.  In fact, there are two: Independence Day, marked 
by fireworks, parades and concerts.  The second is National Language Day.  This reflects a 
weaker state- based identity than found in Estonia, where celebrations litter the calendar, 
reminding the community that they have a strong identity as ―Estonians‖.  The Moldovan 
people, it would seem, do not celebrate state-based identity through public holidays.  The 
literary culture in Moldova likewise shies away from paeans to the state, the following poem 
from 1926 reveals much of the perceived psychological moorings of the people of Moldova: 
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―Norod moldovenesc‖ (The Moldovan people). 
You have passed an entire century 
In heavy chains tormented;  
Made victims by your foes, 
You have never known the sun. 
 
For the nobleman and the landlord  
You have slaved for years on end;  
Born in toil and need, 
You were a wretch and a pauper. 
 
Subjugated and nameless,  
Without right to be human, 
For centuries forgotten by the world,  
You were condemned to slavery. 
        Dimitrii Milev, 1926.
49
 
 
 
Language 
 
Identity and Language 
Language in Moldova speaks volumes of the conundrum this state faces in 
developing its state-based identity.  In spoken form, the language is the product of one 
empire, in written form another.  Moldovan is the same language as Romanian, allowing for 
dialect/regional distinctions that amount to no more than the English equivalents of ―tomato- 
tomato, potato-potato‖ pronunciation differences, and occasional word selection choices, 
akin to calling ―a guy a lad, and a gal a lass.‖50   However, the first grammar and dictionary 
in the 1920s for Moldova varied very little from spoken Romanian, but was written in the 
Cyrillic alphabet. In 1929 the dictionary was purged of ―fancy‖ foreign words as Romanian 
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 King 2000 p. 66 
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 Thanks to Anca Turcu for the descriptive comparisons of Romanian and Moldovan language, personal 
correspondence from Romania. 8 July 2011. 
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had a ―predilection for bourgeois Gallicisms‖ and concentrated on rural speech and Soviet 
literary language to establish rules of grammar (King 2000:68). 
Language is a part of the state-based identity, but it is only one part. The Moldovan 
language debate is consistent with debates over historical allegiance but not of such singular 
importance as it is in the Estonian case.  After all, as Christian Rakovsky, in the 1920s 
pointed out, ―we know that a majority of the population of Switzerland speaks German, and 
that a part speaks French, but no one therefore suggests that the German-speaking cantons 
should be joined to Germany and the French-speaking to the French‖ (Rakovsky in King 
2000: 56).  Moldova changed the written form of language to the Latin alphabet as a matter 
of post-Soviet reforms in the early 1990s.  However, this change was not accepted 
throughout Moldova; in Transnistria language may be spoken in Russian or Moldovan, and is 
still written in Cyrillic. 
 
Globalization and Language 
English is not spoken or taught in Moldova to the extent that could even come close 
to the notions posited by McCrum in ―Globish‖ or even the politically neutral English used in 
Estonia.  English is taught rather as ―linguistic opportunism,‖51 which means that there is 
both a lack of native speakers and effective instruction (Ciscel 2002).  Motivation appears to 
be increasing, but English is not accessible to many students and this can be interpreted as 
further inference that Moldova is focused on internal, rather than global priorities. 
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State Policies 
Education 
Within Moldova, the education system is illustrative of political cleavages in society 
that weaken state-based identity.  The Law on Education and the Law on Functioning of 
Languages Spoken in Moldova stipulates that the state choose the language of instruction for 
all levels of the education process. 
52
   However, Transnistrian schools teach in Russian, or in 
Moldovan written in Cyrillic.  Educators teach that Moldovans are ―outsiders‖ to their moral 
community.  The level of animosity reached such a peak in 2004 that schools in the region 
teaching in Moldovan/Latinized language were closed.  Discomfit with Transnistria‘s 
looking East by using the Cyrillic alphabet and teaching primarily Russian history does not 
imply that the Moldovan education system looks West to Romania with any more hope. 
Identity issues are of such delicate nature that as part of a program by the Moldovan 
government to develop Moldovan identity, in 2002 no scholarships were accepted by 
Moldova that were offered by the Romanian government for attending Romanian schools and 
universities.  This was due to the concern over the weakness of state-based Moldovan 
identity, the scholarships were perceived as threatening in that students would come to reject 
a distinction between Romania and Moldova (Roper 2005). 
The struggle with separation of Romanian and Moldovan identity is fought within the 
education system through curriculum choices especially when it comes to history.  In 2003, 
―History of Moldova‖ courses were introduced into schools through the efforts of Valentin 
Beniuc – Minister of Education – the debate was strong over whether this course should be 
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 Article 8, Law of Education, Law  of Functioning Languages, Articles 18, 19 and 20. World Congress on 
Language Policies, Barcelona, April 16-20, 2002. ―National Minorities Education in Moldova: The Legal 
Framework and Practice‖ A. Stoianova. 
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offered instead of, or as well as, ―History of Romania‖ (Roper 2005).  Given that the two 
states have been joined at various parts of their history the state-based identity of Moldova 
could be strengthened or weakened depending on how each class is taught.  The education 
system is split on identity – should the students‘ education highlight Moldova‘s historical 
connections to Europe or Russia?  Moldova has been dominated by both, the education 
system is struggling to find an independent state-based identity to exalt without disavowing 
connections to its past.  The education system is not the only part of Moldova that struggles 
with the identity pull between Romanian and Russian allegiance.  The geographically 
separate Transnistrians are highlighted in the next section as an example of localized identity 
at war with state-based identity. 
 
Becoming a Citizen 
Citizenship laws enacted by Moldova were very liberal compared to others in Eastern 
Europe: all persons residing within the bounds of the territory on June 23, 1990 (the date of 
the sovereign declaration) became citizens, regardless of any other criteria relating to birth, 
ethnicity, language, and so forth. However, dual citizenship was illegal in Moldova from 
independence until November 2003. 
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Global or Local? 
Local identity prioritized in the Transnistrian Conflict
53
 
The in-depth analysis for Moldova looks specifically into their internal conflict, 
globalization taking less priority in a torn state.  In 1990 the Slavic minority on the east side 
of the river Dnestr chose not to recognize the new parliament in Moldova, comprised of a 
majority of ethnic Moldovans (Uppsala) and a congress of local leadership declared a 
separate Dnestr Moldovan Republic (DMR) on 2 September 1990.  At less than 30 
kilometers wide and just over 4,000 square kilometers in area (King 2000:178), nonetheless 
this sliver of borderland functioned independently from Moldova from that point on and even 
voted to join the U.S.S.R. after Moldova‘s declaration of independence in 1991.  The 
implosion of the Soviet Union did not bring Transnistria back in the Moldovan fold however, 
and the DMR took over police, media and other institutional outlets (Uppsala), eventually 
functioning as a de facto state. DMR and Moldova took to arms on the 13 December 1991 
and by 17 March 1992 the conflict had reached the level of 25 battle-related deaths to count 
as intrastate conflict in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program database (Uppsala).  There has 
been no armed conflict between the sides since the 1992 ceasefire, and a peace agreement, 
the Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of 
Moldova and Transdniestria was signed 8 May 1997. 
A state, even one whose internal divisions are political and not as physically ruinous 
as those torn asunder through years of civil war, still has a weak state-based identity when 
questions of ―who are you‖ are answered with local saliency dominating the state identity 
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even to outsiders.  The DMR hostilities may have ended, but the area has not become a part 
of the state of Moldova.  The symbols of national identity that have been discussed 
throughout this thesis reinforce the internal divisions within the recognized borders of the 
sovereign state of Moldova – the DMR has its own flag, constitution, anthem and currency, 
armed forces and elected political officials (King 2000: 205).  As illustrated in the theory 
section of this thesis, even textbooks in the DMR promulgate the legitimacy of the regime, 
and they do it in the Cyrillic alphabet, which the DMR now uses to differentiate their 
language from Moldovans. 
 
Globalization in Moldova 
 
Figure 2. Globalization in Moldova. 
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As the figure on the previous page shows, Moldova has increased in measures of 
globalization from independence through 2008 with a slight drop off consistently from 2007 
to 2008.  Because this drop-off is at the end of the time frame, whether it is a blip or the 
beginning of a turn away from globalization is undefined.  Specifically, in the 2011 KOF 
index, Moldova ranks 54th in economic globalization, 68th in social globalization, and 130th 
in political globalization for an overall globalization ranking of 63rd.  Like Estonia, the 
greatest change in KOF score between 1991 and 2008 is in the political globalization score, 
moving from 6.6 in 1991 to 56.7 in 2008, but this change still leaves Moldova near the lower 
ranking for political globalization (130th out of 156 countries).  Economic globalization in 
Estonia in 1991 was 42.5 and had increased to a score of 69.5 in 2008.  Social globalization, 
the most important focus for the link between state-based identity and globalization increased 
as well, from 36.4 in 1991 to a score of 59 in 2008. 
What can be determined comparatively from all these numbers is that Moldova 
remains less globalized than Estonia.  Measuring concepts like ―culture‖ and ―social‖ are 
tricky, proxies must be used as heuristics to help us understand the general by measuring 
specifics that we think relate to the general.  This thesis is concerned primarily with the 
social aspects of globalization.  Digging into the numbers that are compiled for the scores 
given in Figure 2 reveals a significant difference in the globalization of Moldova and 
Estonia.  Data from the World Bank (the source for many of the measurements used for 
development of KOF rankings) show that in 1991 there was an average of zero internet users 
per 100 people in Moldova and 0.1 in Estonia.  By 2009, the latest date information is 
available for, Moldova had increased to 35.9 users per 100 people, yet Estonia had 72.3 
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users.  These numbers reflect a telling difference of the level of exposure to globalizing 
influences of the general public in each state. 
 
Conclusion 
 
According to Theda Skocpol, the division of power from the political center of a state 
to autonomous regions, either willingly through political federalism or unwillingly by civil 
conflict, is indicative of a weak state (Skocpol 1985).  The reflective focus of collective 
identity in Moldova, where identity is internally focused on domestic cleavages rather than 
state-level concerns, undermines state-based identity. 
Even the national anthem – a quintessential symbol of the state – undermines state- 
based identity in Moldova. Upon independence from the Soviet Union, Moldova used 
Romania‘s national anthem: ―Romanian, Awake!‖ This was changed by the government to 
the (perhaps ironically named) ―Limba noastră‖ (Our Language), to show that Moldova has a 
state-based identity independent from Romania, despite the fact that the poem by Alexi 
Mateevici, on which the anthem is based, is not explicit as to whether ‗our language‘ refers to 
Moldovan or Romanian, further clouding the debate (King  2000:159). 
The public opinion in the DMR combined with strategic and economic interests led 
political élites to favor ties with Russia (Huntington 1996:165).  When compared to the 
Moldovan government policies actively making ties with the EU, it looks like a unified 
vision of the future will not be shared internally in Moldova any time soon.  The internal 
diffusion of power, and the indecision on whether to orient a state-based identity toward 
European or Russian historical roots shows a lack of unity that is highlighted by the 
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inconsistency of the state control over education in both language and content.  I conclude 
that Moldova is a state with a weak state-based identity with globalizing influences 
permeating only slowly. 
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CHAPTER 7. CASE COMPARISON 
 
Estonia and Moldova share the similar geographic distinction of having been Eastern- 
European border lands to the Soviet Union; the history of the states are in some ways alike 
and in some ways different.  Both Estonia and Moldova have been conquered by subjugating 
forces throughout their history.  The outside rule of these forces reflects differences in 
forming the mentalité of collective memory.  In Estonia, for example, German and 
Scandinavian domination led to developing trade structure and cities as part of the Hanseatic 
league.  Swedish rule in the 17th century included tenets of basic human rights, peasants 
were ―people too‖ and education opportunities increased.  On the other hand, Moldova has a 
collective memory that is bound to the land, and as reflected in the poetry of Dimitrii Milev, 
was ―condemned to slavery‖ and has been treated as a resource tributary throughout its 
history. 
By the 19th century both states were under the rule of the Russian Empire, but in 
Estonia national identity was becoming a cultural force, with singing festivals and literary 
efforts sharing their stories.  The 20th century brought an independence from outsider rule 
for both states.  Estonia became an independent republic for the 20 years of the interwar 
period.  Moldova was independent for two months before becoming a part of Greater 
Romania.  Both states were handed back to Russian rule when the Soviet Union and 
Germany packaged out spheres of rule in the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. 
During the 50 years of rule under the Soviet yoke, communist values such as 
collectivism, authoritarianism, public (over private), were held constant for both Estonia and 
Moldova.  Likewise, the empire stipulated identity of the people rather than allowing choice. 
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Russification of language, culture, and education systems overshadowed national heritage 
movements and communism was, at least nominally, the dominant political belief. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Manfred Steger finds that Western 
commentators ―argued that all political belief systems had converged in a single vision: 
liberal capitalism.‖54  Values associated with globalization, universal human rights, spread of 
―right and proper‖ governing systems (democracy if viewed through western eyes), women‘s 
equality, and universal education were hailed by the ardent supporters of globalization. Those 
who were less favorably inclined to globalizing influences warned of the threat that could 
steamroll nationalities, stamping out esoteric cultural knowledge and history of any culture 
not of European or western descent. 
After the fall of the Soviet empire, Estonia and Moldova were left with different state 
structures and focus.  Estonia became the first post-Soviet republic to adopt a new 
constitution and hold democratic elections, electing 101 members to a unicameral parliament 
– The Riigikogu – which appoints the prime minister and elects the president, and by 
September 1992 the prime minister was Mart Laar (b. 1960) and had no connections to the 
communist past (Raun 2001).  Post-Soviet Moldova has democratic elections also, but has 
maintained ties and reelected communist party members to Parliament, which went on to 
elect several Presidents from the communist party.   
Globalization ―involves human integration, but this is a long-term, uneven, and 
paradoxical process.‖55   It also ―involves the role of local reception of western culture‖56 
and, as opposed to Huntington‘s notion of clashing civilizations (based fundamentally on  
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religious differentiation), J. Nederveen Pieterse finds that there exists in social globalization a 
notion of ―syncretism, the fusion of religious forms.‖57 
Fusion of cultures is sometimes rejected outright.  Moldova switched the written form 
of its language from Cyrillic to Latinized form by way of rejecting Russification of the past. 
Other states, at other times, have taken substantial measures to eliminate symbols of outside 
thoughts, values, and ways (culture!).  The Taleban, for example, 2001‘s destruction of the 5- 
7th Century Buddha‘s (a World Historic Monument) brought home the tangible threat that 
symbols can have to those attempting to maintain alienation from the outside influences.  The 
Estonian removal of the ―Bronze Soldier of Tallinn‖ a Soviet World War II memorial was 
perceived as a symbolic retribution to Sovietization.  The removal led tensions between 
ethnic Russians and Estonians to overheat into ―Bronze Night‖ which was actually two days 
of riots in Tallinn, and triggered the 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonia. 
Shared commonality is reinforced by the very fact that it leads to strong 
―discontinuities‖ in culture and language from others.  Estonia has this shared concept of 
what it means to be Estonian, to speak the language, to hold onto a literary history that 
includes epic heroic poetry of  Kalevipoeg that passes consistently through generations, and 
builds a strong state-based identity that defines Estonians from all Others.  Moldova on the 
other hand, as a bricolage of Romanian and Soviet language and cultural ties, does not build 
its state-based identity on one solid and continuous foundation, discontinuities chip at its 
identity from within, weakening the state-based identity of Moldova. 
Cultural influence is more difficult to measure than economic or military values. 
There is not an objective starting value, no mathematical constant that allows us to add one 
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more part cultural influence to get one more point of change in a globalization variable.  
Even the KOF scores are based on proxies, using heuristics to figure a ―best guess‖ of 
cultural influence.  This means that exploring culture is subjective, a continuing discussion 
rather than a controlled experiment, and conclusions drawn are interpretive projections at 
best. 
Globalization inherently leads to some losses along with general gains; most states 
will experience greater inequality and even, as illustrated by the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 
April 2007, new forms of warfare.  It is interesting that the gains and losses may amount to 
differing perceptions accredited to the same end result.  Both Moldova and Estonia 
acknowledge that young people may loses some feelings of nationalism when exposed to 
global influences.  The same feeling that Jüri Luik notes that young people exposed to 
foreigners through travel may show less patriotism towards their state-based identity, is 
reflected by the Moldovan case of trepidation regarding Romanian scholarships. Both fear 
that it will erode state-based identity slightly – but that is enough for Moldova to refuse 
scholarships because having a weak state-based identity means that the threat perceived by 
any loss by globalizing forces is bad.  Estonians on the other hand welcome the global 
influences, and feel less threatened by it. 
In sum, the cases illustrate through a historically grounded comparison that Estonia 
and Moldova have different state-based identity levels, and their embrace of globalization – 
as reflected in their KOF globalization index scores – differs as expected in accordance with 
their strength of state-based identity.  In Estonia, the state-based identity is relatively strong, 
and in Moldova, it is relatively weak. This difference is reflected in state policy attempts to 
encourage or inhibit globalizing influences within the state. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
 
Future Study and Alternative Approach 
This thesis is a work of an exploratory nature, ―proximal evidence‖ 58 has been 
brought forth, and descriptive inferences were made.  The connections inferred regarding 
these two cases would benefit from future large-n studies to test the relationship through a 
cross-unit approach.  Though generally supported at the ―eye-ball test‖ level – to glance 
through the 2011 KOF index and confirm that states with intuitively stronger state-based 
identities (according to my three factors of culture, language, and state policies that embrace 
globalizing influences) do place higher on the index than those states that seem to lack 
strength in one or more of the factors.  However, it is disconcerting to see Belgium, divided 
by two identities clamoring for primacy at the state level, to be so high on the globalization 
index, and the Republic of Korea, a state that would receive a strong state-based identity 
endorsement, barely making it to the top third of countries for the KOF globalization 
rankings. 
The most likely alternate explanation for my results should be reviewed in the course 
of investigating the connections that I have proffered in this thesis: 
More economically developed states are more open to globalization. 
Can these results be explained away merely by economic development level?  The answer to 
this question is yes and no.  The level of economic development is absolutely a factor in 
rising rankings in the KOF globalization index.  Not just for the economic index, but also for 
the social index as so many of the measures in the social can be attributed also to a developed 
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economy – internet servers and international phone calls, for example.  Economic level can 
be co-determinate without replacing the value of this work, as the cultural side of collective 
identity formation is highlighted here, a shared history, development of norms and 
socialization to the state that cannot be differentiated if looking solely at economic measures. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is not enough to see states interacting in the global arena as merely economic units. 
Politics is about people, collectives that are motivated and mobilized by factors that 
economics alone cannot explain, this research sheds light through investigating the historical 
antecedents of state-based identity to shed light on their response to globalization.  In forging 
a state-based identity these countries are not the only ones facing a way of identifying 
themselves internally and externally – other nation-states, such as Ireland project a state- 
based identity to the outside that is to some extent manufactured. ―Riverdance does not 
spring from the eternal well of the Irish soul; rather, it is manufactured by the global cultural 
industry‖ (Fagan 2001:123). 
James Rosenau claims that political space is no longer solely defined in terms of 
territory; people no longer have a strict association between their own welfare and that of 
their territorial community.
59
   Yet states still exist as actors in the international structure, 
populated by people who are identified across the globe by their state-based identity.  We 
carry passports that proclaim our identities as citizens for traveling outside of our state, yet 
Jan Aart Scholte tells us that we have moved beyond the ―monochrome fixation on…state- 
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centered nationhood‖ and now identify ourselves in a more pluralistic, hybridized manner – 
faith, class, gender, race, age, etc…mixed in with a still healthy-sized dose of nationality.  It 
is in the variations of that ―dose of nationality‖ that this thesis has focused, finding that states 
with stronger or weaker state-based identities react differently to globalizing influences.  The 
link between state-based identity and globalization is revealing as post-Soviet European 
states interact on the global scale. 
State-based identity strength, I have claimed in this thesis, is indicated by these three 
factors: First, common culture – a solid collective memory that ties past, current, and future 
identity to the state.  Second, language – indigenous language reinforces state-based identity, 
whereas vestiges of empire and a language foisted on the people by outsiders indicates a 
weaker state-based identity.  Thirdly, state policies – education, citizenship requirements, and 
public holidays are used to illustrate how the state communicates identity to the population 
and molds loyalty of the collective. 
This thesis studied two cases: Estonia and Moldova.  The states are similar in that 
they border Europe, and were traded to the authority of the Soviet Union at the same time by 
the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, which bound their identities to 
the Soviet Union for most of the last century, and they were released in the same wave of 
independence.  Nonetheless, the differences are striking between the state-based identity of 
each state.  Estonians have a common culture, a unique language, and celebrate many public 
holidays heralding their existence as an individual state.  Moldovans, on the other hand, are 
internally divided as to whether they are culturally European or Orthodox.  They speak the 
language of one neighboring state and yet some still write in the alphabet of a different 
neighboring state, and celebrate just two public holidays a year that proclaim state-based 
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identity.  Facing the same challenge to stand on their own after years yoked to the Soviet 
Union, Estonia and Moldova interact with the many and varied processes of globalization to 
differing degrees, and those differences may be accounted for partially by their differing 
levels of state-based identity. 
This thesis has been an exploratory look into the relationship between the strength of 
state-based identities and globalization.  I have argued that the differences in the state-based 
identity of Estonia and Moldova help explain their relative openness towards globalization.  I 
have shown that Estonia has a stronger state-based identity and engages with globalizing 
influences and policies as I expected, whilst the weaker state-based identity of Moldova 
epitomizes the defensive positioning that is associated with the perception of global 
influences being seen as undermining of state- based loyalties, leading Moldova to 
concentrate on internal issues, and is less able to engage with globalization. 
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APPENDIX 
2010 KOF Index of Globalization 
Indices and Variables Weights 
 
A. Economic Globalization [37%] 
i) Actual Flows (50%) 
Trade (percent of GDP) (19%) 
Foreign Direct Investment, flows (percent of GDP) (20%) 
Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP) (24%)  
Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP) (17%) 
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP) (20%) 
ii) Restrictions (50%) 
Hidden Import Barriers (22%)  
Mean Tariff Rate (28%) 
Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue) (27%)  
Capital Account Restrictions (22%) 
 
B. Social Globalization [39%] 
i) Data on Personal Contact (33%)  
Telephone Traffic (26%)  
Transfers (percent of GDP) (3%) 
 International Tourism (26%) 
Foreign Population (percent of total population) (20%)  
International letters (per capita) (25%) 
ii) Data on Information Flows (36%) 
Internet Users (per 1000 people) (36%)  
Television (per 1000 people) (36%) 
Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP) (28%) 
iii) Data on Cultural Proximity (31%) 
Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per capita) (43%)  
Number of Ikea (per capita) (44%) 
Trade in books (percent of GDP) (12%) 
 
C. Political Globalization [25%] 
Embassies in Country (25%) 
Membership in International Organizations (28%)  
Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions (22%) 
International Treaties (25%) 
 
Source: 
Dreher, Axel, 2006, ―Does Globalization Affect Growth? 
Empirical Evidence from a new Index,‖ Applied Economics 38, 10: 1091-1110. 
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